Central Intelligence Agency



DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

18 November 1985

1985 Provincial Leadership Change	es	25X1
Summary		
Between April and October, China's reform le largest turnover of provincial leaders since early 198 provincial party heads and 10 governors. The new a overwhelmingly support reform policies and general Xiaoping's ideal of "younger and better educated." I new provincial leaders have engineering background are split between former China Youth League cadres	83, replacing 14 appointees ly conform to Deng Roughly half of the 43 ls, and the remainder	
officials.	o and dareer recar party	25 X 1
Many of the new provincial leaders apparently several years ago by central reformers and marked to senior, more established provincial cadres. We belied the appointees' careers on course over a period of young reformist political strength and skill. In our provincial leaders now owe their positions to central to established provincial power bases, and thus are	for promotion past eve the ability to keep years demonstrates judgment, most I patronage rather than	25 X 1
	f East Asia,	25 X 1
Office of Central Reference. Information available a used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcom Chief, Domestic, China, OEA,	ne and may be directed to the	25 X 1
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so	sponsive to Beijing's me cases with entrer rmer leaders.	policy guidance. The ached bureaucracies a	y will still have to co and the lingering influ	ntend in ence of 25X1
Deng's N	early Clean Sweep			
better ed leaders – – have to f the "re party first proteges. and 24 go number of provincial governors remaining	ucated, reform-minde including the province gradually replace volutionary committed secretaries were replaced tower-level officials turnovers picked up party heads (now test by the end of Octob provincial leader whe	d cadres into key nat cial party chiefs and ed under this policy. Let's of the Cultural Replaced by officials more of changes came in each province wat again this spring, lear med "secretary" rather. Hunan's Secretary was appointed before a secretary was	oping has steadily motional and regional potential potential for the heads of provincing the abolish evolution, a number of reloyal to Deng Xiao early 1983, when 11 period. At the same is cut dramatically. The ding to the replacement of the	sts. Provincial al governments ament in 1979 f provincial ping and his party leaders time, the ne pace of ent of 14 y"), and 10 w the only egan. 25X1
accompar	ied by almost comple	vincial leaders over the ete turnovers in the noorts, since January 1	ne past three years ha nanagement of key pr 983:	s been ovincial offices.
• Ne on	w Public Security Bur which information is	eau directors have be available. Hunan has	en identified in 25 of changed its director	27 provinces twice.
• Ne	w directors were nam	ned in the Propaganda	Departments of 26 p	provinces.
• Ne of	w directors have beer 26 provinces.	n named to provincial	Discipline Inspection	Commissions
• Ne on	w Organization Depar which we have inform	tment directors have mation.	emerged in 27 of the	28 provinces
top provin	nges suggest that Be cial leaders, but also vincial bureaucracies.	have made significan	only have succeeded t progress in changin	in replacing g the leaders 25X1
In this three s	pecial m <u>unicipalit</u> ies.	rs to China's 21 provi "Governor" refers to	nces, five autonomou governors, chairmen,	s regions, and and mayors of 25X1
² Guizhoi Guizhoi	i's party secretary ha i's case is counted as	s been changed twice a single leadership (this year; however, i	n this paper, 25X1

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Patterns of New Appointees	
The career patterns of the provincial leaders appointed this year generally fal within one of three categories:	I
 We identify four new secretaries as former Communist Youth League cadres. 	
 Five new secretaries and eight new governors have specific engineering or technical backgrounds. 	
 Four new secretaries and two new governors may be considered long-time "regulars." 	party
	25X1
Information on the new appointees is summarized in the appendix.	25 X 1
The 1985 appointments are younger, better educated, and more cosmopolitan than their predecessors. Only two are over 60, and the average age is 54. At least new leaders attended college or have technical school educations, and at least 12 has traveled overseas, six to the United States.	19
Although most of the leaders appointed this year are natives of the provinces which they now serve, a significant portion did not rise through party ranks in these provinces, but rather were noticed by Beijing several years ago and have subsequent been promoted past more senior local officials. Twelve of the 24 new appointees we named full or alternate members of the Central Committee in 1982. Because many repositions that would not normally warrant Central Committee membership, their appointments suggested they were marked for higher positions. Seventeen of the necessary were appointed deputy secretary or vice governor in 1983, again suggesting were being groomed for their present roles.	ily ere eld
We believe a significant consequence of these appointments is that most new provincial leaders tend to owe primary allegiance to China's central leadership rather than to established provincial power bases. As a result, central leaders may have less trouble dealing with independent-minded provincial leaders than in the past.	ss
Associations With Central Leaders	25X1
The four China Youth League alumni among the new appointees served in tha organization under the leadership of either Hu Yaobang or Hu Qili, and may be considered proteges of these men. Three new leaders are linked with Premier Zhao Ziyang: Guangdong Secretary Lin Ruo, Henan Secretary Yang Xizong (who worked wit Zhao in Sichuan Province), and Xizang Secretary Wu Jinghua. Shanghai's new secretarn mayor, Rui Xingwen and Jiang Zemin, are associated with Vice Premier Li Peng through their former ministerial assignments.	h

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With the exception of three new governors, all this year's provincial leadership appointees are full or alternate members of the Central Committee. Ten new provincial secretaries and five new governors were named full members of the Central Committee at the September party meetings (three new secretaries and one mayor were already full Central Committee members, and three new secretaries and four new governors were already alternate members). All provincial secretaries with the exception of Xinjiang's Song Hanliang are now full Central Committee members. Song was elected an alternate member this September and was subsequently appointed to replace Wang Enmao as Xinjiang Party Secretary. Governorship does not necessarily lead to Central Committee membership—altogether eight governors are not on the Central Committee and four are alternate members, which reflects the lower prestige and power of the governor's position.

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What's Ahead

The completion of provincial changes has strengthened the position of Deng Xiaoping and his proteges at the provincial level. These changes should improve the reformers' ability to implement economic policies, as well as help keep party rectification efforts and the recruitment of younger, better educated party members on track. The provincial leadership changes also strengthen Deng Xiaoping's succession arrangements by bolstering the power bases of Deng's proteges, especially Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang.

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The new provincial leadership arrangements will not end the struggle between provincial interests and central policies, however. Some of the new appointees may be viewed in their own provinces as Beijing's representatives rather than provincial leaders, which could weaken their effectiveness in dealing with entrenched provincial bureaucracies. We expect that some new provincial leaders may need occasional bolstering from Beijing, and additional changes may be in order if some of the appointees prove unable to manage their assignments. We also expect that some of the new appointees will have to deal with the remaining influence of outgoing provincial bosses. For example, Yunnan's former party chief An Pingsheng and Guangxi's former party chief Qiao Xiaoguang, both elderly provincial bosses who were considered hostile to Deng Xiaoping's reform programs, have retained their memberships on the Central Committee, and probably continue to exert influence in their home provinces. Over time, however, we expect the new leaders to establish their own bases of authority, particularly as party rectification brings younger, reform—minded cadres into subprovincial slots.

Appendix: 1985 Provincial Leadership Appointees

Name/Province	Age	Named to Central Committee	Background
		I. The CYL Alumni	
Hu Jintao Guizhou Secretary	42	Sept 1982 – Alt. Sept 1985 – Full	Gansu CYL First Secretary, 1982-84
Liang Buting Shandong Secretary	64	Sept 1982 - Full	Qinghai First Secretary, 1980-82 Shandong Governor, 1983-85 Shandong Secretary (Jointly with Su Yiran), 1983-85
Wan Shaofen (f) Jiangxi Secretary	54	Sept 1985 - Full	Former Head of Nanchang Municipal CYL Committee Former Head of Jiangxi Organization Department
Xing Chongzhi Hebei Secretary	58	Sept 1982 – Alt. Sept 1985 Full	Former Central CYL Official, Early 1960s Hebei Deputy Secretary, 1983–85
		II. The Engineers	
Chen Huiguang Guangxi Secretary	46	Sept 1985 - Full	Mining Engineer; Former Dep Director, Guangxi Coal Bureau Guangxi Dep Secretary, 1983-85
Gao Dezhan Jilin Governor	NA	Sept 1982 - Alt.	Chemical Engineering graduate, Harbin Univ. Former Director, Jilin Chemical Company Jilin Vice Governor, 1983-85
He Zhiqiang Yunnan Governor	50	Not on CC	Geology Graduate, Chongqing University Naxi Minority Yunnan Vice Governor, 1983–85

Hou Jie Heilongjiang Gov	54	Sept 1985 - Full	Agricultural Specialist Vice Chairman Heilongjiang Revolutionary Committee 1977-79 Heilongjiang Vice Governor, 1979-85
Jiang Minkuan Sichuan Governor	55	Sept 1982 - Alt. Sept 1985 - Full	Former Sichuan Factory Manager Sichuan Vice Governor, 1983–85
Jiang Zemin Shanghai Mayor	58	Sept 1982 - Full	Electrical Engineering Graduate Minister of Electronics, 1983-85
Li Changan Shandong Governor	50	Sept 1982 - Alt. Sept 1985 - Full	Machine Tool Specialist Beijing Electronics Factory Manager, 1979–80 Shandong Dep Secretary, 1983–85
Li Guixian Liaoning Secretary	47	Sept 1985 - Full	Chemical Engineer Former Dep Director, Liaoning Electrical Industry Bureau
Ni Xiance Jiangxi Governor	49	Not on CC	Metallurgy Specialist Jiangxi Vice Governor, 1983-85
Rui Xingwen Shanghai Secretary	59	Sept 1985 - Full	Minister of Urban and Rural Construction, 1984–85 Vice Minister State Planning Commission, 1984
Song Hanliang Xinjiang Secretary	51	Sept 1985 - Alt.	Petroleum Engineer Former Xinjiang Petroleum Bureau Official
Song Ruixiang Qinghai Governor	46	Not on CC	Geologist
Ye Xuanping Guangdong Governor	61	Feb 1982 - Alt. Sept 1985 - Full	Studied Engineering in USSR Guangdong Vice Governor, 1980-83 Guangzhou Mayor, 1983-85

Yin Kesheng Qinghai Secretary	53	Sept 1985 - Full	Petroleum Engineer Qinghai Vice Governor, 1983-85
		III. The Party Regulars	
Lin Ruo Secretary,	61	Sept 1982 - Full	Guangdong Deputy
Guangdong Secretary			1983-85
Pu Chaozhu Yunnan Secretary	55	Sept 1985 - Full	Yunnan Governor, 1983-1985
Wu Jinghua Xizang Secretary	54	Sept 1982 - Full	Yi Minority Vice Chairman State Nationalities Affairs Commission, 1979–85
Xiong Qingquan Hunan Governor	51	Sept 1982 - Alt. Sept 1985 - Full	Hunan Deputy Secretary, 1983-85
Yang Xizong Henan Secretary	57	Sept 1982 – Alt. Sept 1985 – Full	Sichuan Governor, 1983-85
		Data Insufficient to Classify	
Gao Di Jilin Secretary	58	Sept 1985 - Full	Jilin Deputy Secretary, 1983-85

Subject: China: 1985 Provincial Leadership Changes

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Other

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1 - DDI (7E47)
1 - NIC/ Analytic Group
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1 - D/OEA (4F18)
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1 - SRP (5G00)
1 - OEA Production Staff (4G48)
1 - C/OEA/SDS (4G32)
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEF (4G32)
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEV (4G32)
1 - C/OEA/CH/DOM (4G32)
1 - C/OEA/CH/FOR (4G32)
1 - C/OEA/NA (4G43)
1 - C/OEA/SA (4F38)
1 - PDB Staff (7G15)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
1 - CPAS/<u>ILS</u> (7G15)
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1 - CH/EA
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1 - C/PES (7G15)
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1 - C/DO(3D01)
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